TY - GEN
T1 - A Game Theoretic Approach to Decision Making in Neuronal Networks
AU - Abass, Ahmed A.Alabdel
AU - Mandayam, Narayan B.
AU - Gajic, Zoran
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - We formulate as a game, the dynamic interaction scenario among three populations of neurons with different functions and capabilities. Specifically, we consider two populations of excitatory neurons where each population is responsible for a direction of movement, say, right and left. Both the excitatory neuron populations are connected to an inhibitory neurons population. Each excitatory population wants to take control of the movement. We formulate a game theoretic view of this competition. Specifically, we assume that the activity level of each neuronal population is quantized in to two levels. We transform the dynamical system model that exists in the literature, see for example [1], for this problem to create the game utilities. We characterize, through the replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, the evolutionary stable strategies and find conditions under which they hold. Finally, we use the phase portrait to show the evolution of the evolutionary stable strategies from different initial conditions. We find that mixed strategies cannot be a part of the game solution. In addition, we find that the case of no or low activity is the worst case and there are no initial conditions or neurons coordination that can overcome it.
AB - We formulate as a game, the dynamic interaction scenario among three populations of neurons with different functions and capabilities. Specifically, we consider two populations of excitatory neurons where each population is responsible for a direction of movement, say, right and left. Both the excitatory neuron populations are connected to an inhibitory neurons population. Each excitatory population wants to take control of the movement. We formulate a game theoretic view of this competition. Specifically, we assume that the activity level of each neuronal population is quantized in to two levels. We transform the dynamical system model that exists in the literature, see for example [1], for this problem to create the game utilities. We characterize, through the replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, the evolutionary stable strategies and find conditions under which they hold. Finally, we use the phase portrait to show the evolution of the evolutionary stable strategies from different initial conditions. We find that mixed strategies cannot be a part of the game solution. In addition, we find that the case of no or low activity is the worst case and there are no initial conditions or neurons coordination that can overcome it.
KW - Evolutionary Game Theory
KW - Inhibitory Neurons
KW - Neuronal Population
KW - Spiking Neural Networks
KW - Stability Analysis
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U2 - 10.1109/ICECCE49384.2020.9179183
DO - 10.1109/ICECCE49384.2020.9179183
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85091905202
T3 - 2nd International Conference on Electrical, Communication and Computer Engineering, ICECCE 2020
BT - 2nd International Conference on Electrical, Communication and Computer Engineering, ICECCE 2020
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2nd International Conference on Electrical, Communication and Computer Engineering, ICECCE 2020
Y2 - 12 June 2020 through 13 June 2020
ER -