A strategic market game with complete markets

Rabah Amir, Siddharta Sahi, Martin Shubik, Shuntian Yao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

50 Scopus citations

Abstract

An exchange economy is modeled as a strategic market game with all pairwise markets available. Existence of noncooperative equilibria is proved. It is shown that if resources are distributed in a skewed manner, in equilibrium prices may not satisfy the no arbitrage condition. One round of trade even with all goods serving as money is not sufficient to provide enough liquidity for efficient trade.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)126-143
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume51
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1990

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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