Abstract
I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various types of cases. I conclude by considering how another moral method that I call virtual divisibility functions and what it helps reveal about an argument by Otsuka against those who do not think numbers count.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-23 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Utilitas |
Volume | 17 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 23 2005 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
- Sociology and Political Science