Aggregation and Two Moral Methods

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various types of cases. I conclude by considering how another moral method that I call virtual divisibility functions and what it helps reveal about an argument by Otsuka against those who do not think numbers count.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-23
Number of pages23
JournalUtilitas
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2005
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • Sociology and Political Science

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