TY - JOUR
T1 - AI wellbeing
AU - Goldstein, Simon
AU - Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2025.
PY - 2025/6
Y1 - 2025/6
N2 - Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its clear bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little direct attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual’s welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. Along the way, we argue that there are good reasons to believe that artificial systems can have wellbeing even if they are not phenomenally conscious. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that there is a significant probability that some AI systems have or will soon have wellbeing and that this should lead us to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create.
AB - Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its clear bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little direct attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual’s welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. Along the way, we argue that there are good reasons to believe that artificial systems can have wellbeing even if they are not phenomenally conscious. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that there is a significant probability that some AI systems have or will soon have wellbeing and that this should lead us to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create.
KW - AI
KW - Belief
KW - Desire
KW - Desire satisfactionism
KW - Experientialism
KW - Propositional attitudes
KW - Wellbeing
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85219733714&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2
DO - 10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85219733714
SN - 2731-4642
VL - 4
JO - Asian Journal of Philosophy
JF - Asian Journal of Philosophy
IS - 1
M1 - 25
ER -