An auctioning mechanism for green radio

Cristina Comaniciu, Narayan Mandayam, H. Vincent Poor, Jean Marie Gorce

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes' dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)114-121
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Communications and Networks
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2010

Fingerprint

Energy conservation
Energy resources
Costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Keywords

  • Cellular
  • Cooperative relaying
  • Green radio
  • Interference management
  • Pricing
  • Vickrey auction

Cite this

Comaniciu, Cristina ; Mandayam, Narayan ; Vincent Poor, H. ; Gorce, Jean Marie. / An auctioning mechanism for green radio. In: Journal of Communications and Networks. 2010 ; Vol. 12, No. 2. pp. 114-121.
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An auctioning mechanism for green radio. / Comaniciu, Cristina; Mandayam, Narayan; Vincent Poor, H.; Gorce, Jean Marie.

In: Journal of Communications and Networks, Vol. 12, No. 2, 01.01.2010, p. 114-121.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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