Analyses of Cardinal Auctions

Mangesh Gupte, Darja Krushevskaja, S. Muthukrishnan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study cardinal auctions for selling multiple copies of a good, in which bidders specify not only their bid or how much they are ready to pay for the good, but also a cardinality constraint on the number of copies that will be sold via the auction. We perform first known Price of Anarchy type analyses with detailed comparison of the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and one based on minimum pay property (MPP) which is similar to Generalized Second Price auction commonly used in sponsored search. Without cardinality constraints, MPP has the same efficiency (total value to bidders) and at least as much revenue (total income to the auctioneer) as VCG; this also holds for certain other generalizations of MPP (e.g., prefix constrained auctions, as we show here). In contrast, our main results are that, with cardinality constraints.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)889-903
Number of pages15
JournalAlgorithmica
Volume71
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Applied Mathematics

Keywords

  • Auction design
  • Efficiency
  • Revenue

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