TY - JOUR
T1 - Bargaining, fear, and denial
T2 - Explaining violence against civilians in Iraq 2004-2007
AU - Boyle, Michael J.
N1 - Funding Information:
The author is grateful to Peter Bagnall and Kate Elkin for their helpful research assistance on this piece. The data is generously provided by the Iraq Body Count (IBC), with the kind permission of John Sloboda. This research has been generously supported by the Airey Neave Trust. A version of this paper was presented at the 2008 International Studies Association (ISA) conference in San Francisco. The author is grateful for the helpful comments of Charli Carpenter, Alexander Downes, Shane Drennan, Brad McAllister, Alex Schmid, John Sloboda, and Charles Tripp. All errors and omissions remain his own.
PY - 2009/4
Y1 - 2009/4
N2 - From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003-2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logicsbargaining, fear, and denialthat are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the localization of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.
AB - From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003-2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logicsbargaining, fear, and denialthat are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the localization of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.
KW - Violence Iraq terrorism bargaining
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U2 - 10.1080/09546550902765565
DO - 10.1080/09546550902765565
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:67651208612
SN - 0954-6553
VL - 21
SP - 261
EP - 287
JO - Terrorism and Political Violence
JF - Terrorism and Political Violence
IS - 2
ER -