Beliefs and Subdoxastic States

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


This chapter explores the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It makes a plausible case for the claim that the intuitive distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states marks a real and psychologically interesting boundary. Moreover, it is a boundary that has been largely overlooked by contemporary work in cognitive simulation. The chapter also presents a critique of Gilbert Harman's view, that may be viewed as an attack on the psychological significance of the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. It suggests that, like Harman, many of those concerned with cognitive simulation have been so captivated with the promise of inferential accounts of the mechanisms underlying perception and thought that they have failed to note the rather special and largely isolated nature of the inferential processes between beliefs and subdoxastic states.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCollected Papers
Subtitle of host publicationMind and Language, 1972-2010
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780190267513
ISBN (Print)9780199734108
StatePublished - Sep 22 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Arts and Humanities


  • Beliefs
  • Cognitive simulation
  • Gilbert harman
  • Human psychology
  • Intuitive distinction
  • Intuitive judgments
  • Psychological distinction
  • Subdoxastic states


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