Blackwell's ordering and public information

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (Amer. Econom. Rev. 61 (1971) 561) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of Blackwell and welfare is fully general. Furthermore, Blackwell's ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking, and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)179-197
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume114
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2004

Fingerprint

Ranking
Public information
Competitive equilibrium
Solution concepts
Comparative statics
Uncertainty

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Blackwell's ordering
  • Information
  • Risk sharing

Cite this

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Blackwell's ordering and public information. / Campbell, Colin M.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 114, No. 2, 02.2004, p. 179-197.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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