Capital Preferences: International Capital and Government Partisanship

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Many argue that government partisanship influences the size of investment flows into stocks and bonds. But existing literature tells us little about how international capital flows influence election outcomes. I argue that passive investment into stocks, bonds, and other debt instruments-in other words, portfolio investments-increases political contributions to right-wing parties. This investment generates resources for domestic capitalists. These owners of capital then channel these resources into political contributions to right-wing parties and enhance those parties' electoral position. Thus, passive investment bolsters the electoral chances of right-wing governments. I illustrate this process with a formal model of special interest politics in which lobbies operate under budget constraint. Using a new data set on political contributions and statistical analyses for a sample of states from 1980-2009, I find support for my general argument.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)776-789
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Studies Quarterly
Volume59
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Capital Preferences: International Capital and Government Partisanship'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this