Abstract
The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view (hereafter, 'computationalists') claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 253-259 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 1 2010 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History
- History and Philosophy of Science
Keywords
- Cognitive capacities
- Computation
- Explanation
- Representational content
Cite this
}
Computational models : A modest role for content. / Egan, Mary.
In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Vol. 41, No. 3, 01.09.2010, p. 253-259.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Computational models
T2 - A modest role for content
AU - Egan, Mary
PY - 2010/9/1
Y1 - 2010/9/1
N2 - The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view (hereafter, 'computationalists') claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.
AB - The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view (hereafter, 'computationalists') claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.
KW - Cognitive capacities
KW - Computation
KW - Explanation
KW - Representational content
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77957166818&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77957166818&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.009
DO - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.009
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77957166818
VL - 41
SP - 253
EP - 259
JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
SN - 0039-3681
IS - 3
ER -