Contrivance and collusion: The corporate origins of shareholder derivative litigation in the United States

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Abstract

Since at least the 1930s, corporate managers and their attorneys have denounced shareholder derivative suits.1 They have painted such actions as dangerous vehicles for unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys to manufacture frivolous claims that permit stockholders to harass faithful, hard-working corporate officers and directors.2 In particular, critics have charged that derivative suits have allowed aggressive plaintiffs' lawyers to manipulate unsophisticated, impressionable small investors (or, worse yet, to collude with repeat or "professional plaintiffs") to pursue groundless litigation against corporate management for the purpose of extracting unreasonable settlements.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1479-1522
Number of pages44
JournalRutgers Law Review
Volume67
Issue number6
StatePublished - Jun 1 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Law

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