TY - JOUR
T1 - Dempster's rule of combination
AU - Shafer, Glenn
N1 - Funding Information:
Some of the work in this paper was done while the author was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship. The work was completed with support from the General Research Fund of the University of Kansas , allocations # 3991-x038 and # 3315-x038 .
Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2016/12/1
Y1 - 2016/12/1
N2 - The theory of belief functions is a generalization of probability theory; a belief function is a set function more general than a probability measure but whose values can still be interpreted as degrees of belief. Dempster's rule of combination is a rule for combining two or more belief functions; when the belief functions combined are based on distinct or “independent” sources of evidence, the rule corresponds intuitively to the pooling of evidence. As a special case, the rule yields a rule of conditioning which generalizes the usual rule for conditioning probability measures. The rule of combination was studied extensively, but only in the case of finite sets of possibilities, in the author's monograph A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. The present paper describes the rule for general, possibly infinite, sets of possibilities. We show that the rule preserves the regularity conditions of continuity and condensability, and we investigate the two distinct generalizations of probabilistic independence which the rule suggests.
AB - The theory of belief functions is a generalization of probability theory; a belief function is a set function more general than a probability measure but whose values can still be interpreted as degrees of belief. Dempster's rule of combination is a rule for combining two or more belief functions; when the belief functions combined are based on distinct or “independent” sources of evidence, the rule corresponds intuitively to the pooling of evidence. As a special case, the rule yields a rule of conditioning which generalizes the usual rule for conditioning probability measures. The rule of combination was studied extensively, but only in the case of finite sets of possibilities, in the author's monograph A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. The present paper describes the rule for general, possibly infinite, sets of possibilities. We show that the rule preserves the regularity conditions of continuity and condensability, and we investigate the two distinct generalizations of probabilistic independence which the rule suggests.
KW - Belief function
KW - Cognitive independence
KW - Conditioning
KW - Dempster's rule
KW - Evidential independence
KW - Upper probabilities
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U2 - 10.1016/j.ijar.2015.12.009
DO - 10.1016/j.ijar.2015.12.009
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84955262690
SN - 0888-613X
VL - 79
SP - 26
EP - 40
JO - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
JF - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
ER -