Abstract
According to dual aspect semanticists, a theory of meaning for a language L consists of two components: one provides an account of the relations between language and the world (truth theory), the other an account of understanding and cognitive significance (inferential role). This chapter elaborates on these suggestions and argues that these theorists are wrong. Instead, it defends a purely Davidsonian truth theoretic approach.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Meaning, Mind, and Matter |
Subtitle of host publication | Philosophical Essays |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191595264 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199580781 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 1 2011 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Arts and Humanities(all)
Keywords
- Cognitive significance
- Dual aspect semanticists
- Theory of meaning
- Truth theory