TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamic information acquisition and time-varying uncertainty
AU - Cai, Zhifeng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2019/11
Y1 - 2019/11
N2 - This paper studies the role of information acquisition in propagating/stabilizing uncertainty shocks in a dynamic financial market. In a static world, uncertainty raises the value of information, which encourages more information acquisition. In a dynamic world, however, uncertainty can depress information acquisition through a dynamic complementarity channel: More uncertainty induces future investors to trade more cautiously. This renders future resale stock price less informative and reduces the value of information today. Due to the dynamic complementarity, transitory uncertainty shocks can have long-lasting impacts. Direct government purchases can stimulate information production, eliminate equilibrium multiplicity, and attenuate the impacts of uncertainty shocks by raising the effective risk-bearing capacity of the informed investors.
AB - This paper studies the role of information acquisition in propagating/stabilizing uncertainty shocks in a dynamic financial market. In a static world, uncertainty raises the value of information, which encourages more information acquisition. In a dynamic world, however, uncertainty can depress information acquisition through a dynamic complementarity channel: More uncertainty induces future investors to trade more cautiously. This renders future resale stock price less informative and reduces the value of information today. Due to the dynamic complementarity, transitory uncertainty shocks can have long-lasting impacts. Direct government purchases can stimulate information production, eliminate equilibrium multiplicity, and attenuate the impacts of uncertainty shocks by raising the effective risk-bearing capacity of the informed investors.
KW - Dynamic complementarity
KW - Financial markets
KW - Information acquisition
KW - Multiplicity
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104947
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104947
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85073505705
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 184
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
M1 - 104947
ER -