TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis of Advanced Persistent Threats Against Cloud Storage
AU - Abass, Ahmed A.Alabdel
AU - Xiao, Liang
AU - Mandayam, Narayan B.
AU - Gajic, Zoran
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant ACI-1541069. The work of A. A. Alabdel Abass was supported by the Higher Committee for Education Development in Iraq. The work of L. Xiao was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61671396 and in part by the CCF-Venustech Hongyan Research Initiative under Grant 2016-010.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent stealthy, powerful, long-term, and well-funded attacks against cyber systems, such as data centers and cloud storage. Evolutionary game theory is used to capture the long-term continuous behavior of the APTs on the cloud storage devices. Two APT defense games with discrete strategies are formulated, in which both an APT attacker and a defender compete to control one or multiple storage devices regarding their attack or defense intervals. The dynamical stability of each defense and attack strategy pair is studied according to the replicator dynamics criteria to characterize the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium strategies. The evolutionary stable strategy is discussed in each game, which is a subset of the asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium (NE). The phase portraits provide the locally asymptotically stable points of the APT defense game, which represent the NE showing the relationship between the asymptotic stability and evolutionary stability.
AB - Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent stealthy, powerful, long-term, and well-funded attacks against cyber systems, such as data centers and cloud storage. Evolutionary game theory is used to capture the long-term continuous behavior of the APTs on the cloud storage devices. Two APT defense games with discrete strategies are formulated, in which both an APT attacker and a defender compete to control one or multiple storage devices regarding their attack or defense intervals. The dynamical stability of each defense and attack strategy pair is studied according to the replicator dynamics criteria to characterize the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium strategies. The evolutionary stable strategy is discussed in each game, which is a subset of the asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium (NE). The phase portraits provide the locally asymptotically stable points of the APT defense game, which represent the NE showing the relationship between the asymptotic stability and evolutionary stability.
KW - Evolutionary game theory
KW - advanced persistent threats
KW - cloud storage
KW - replicator dynamics
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U2 - 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2691326
DO - 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2691326
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85026428464
VL - 5
SP - 8482
EP - 8491
JO - IEEE Access
JF - IEEE Access
SN - 2169-3536
M1 - 7892931
ER -