Evolutionary game theoretic analysis of distributed denial of service attacks in a wireless network

Ahmed A.Alabdel Abass, Mohammad Hajimirsadeghi, Narayan Mandayam, Zoran Gajic

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a wireless network of M users connected to an access point in the presence of N jammers whose purpose is to deny or degrade the performance of the users by injecting interference. Using the achieved signal to inference plus noise ratio (SINR) as the performance metric, we study the dynamics of such a distributed denial of service attack (DDoA) by using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Specifically, we consider a cooperative network model, where the M users (and N jammers) can collectively enhance their achieved SINR (degrade the user SINR). We model the strategic transmission decisions of the users (and the jammers) using simple random access techniques where the users (and jammers) decide to transmit or not with a transmission probability, taking into account their energy costs. Using the replicator dynamics (RD), we characterize the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS's) of the game and observe that the resulting transmission probabilities turn out to be either 0 or 1. Further, given a network (channel) setting, we show using a phase portrait of the replicator dynamics how the ESS strategies evolve for different cooperation levels of the users and jammers populations. We also provide insights into resulting ESS strategies as a function of the number of users and jammers, and their channel qualities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages36-41
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781467394574
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 26 2016
Event50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016 - Princeton, United States
Duration: Mar 16 2016Mar 18 2016

Publication series

Name2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016

Other

Other50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016
CountryUnited States
CityPrinceton
Period3/16/163/18/16

Fingerprint

Wireless networks
Game theory
Denial-of-service attack
Costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems

Keywords

  • Denial of Service Attack
  • Evolutionary Game Theory
  • Jamming
  • Replicator Dynamics

Cite this

Abass, A. A. A., Hajimirsadeghi, M., Mandayam, N., & Gajic, Z. (2016). Evolutionary game theoretic analysis of distributed denial of service attacks in a wireless network. In 2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016 (pp. 36-41). [7460473] (2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2016.7460473
Abass, Ahmed A.Alabdel ; Hajimirsadeghi, Mohammad ; Mandayam, Narayan ; Gajic, Zoran. / Evolutionary game theoretic analysis of distributed denial of service attacks in a wireless network. 2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 36-41 (2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016).
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abstract = "We consider a wireless network of M users connected to an access point in the presence of N jammers whose purpose is to deny or degrade the performance of the users by injecting interference. Using the achieved signal to inference plus noise ratio (SINR) as the performance metric, we study the dynamics of such a distributed denial of service attack (DDoA) by using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Specifically, we consider a cooperative network model, where the M users (and N jammers) can collectively enhance their achieved SINR (degrade the user SINR). We model the strategic transmission decisions of the users (and the jammers) using simple random access techniques where the users (and jammers) decide to transmit or not with a transmission probability, taking into account their energy costs. Using the replicator dynamics (RD), we characterize the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS's) of the game and observe that the resulting transmission probabilities turn out to be either 0 or 1. Further, given a network (channel) setting, we show using a phase portrait of the replicator dynamics how the ESS strategies evolve for different cooperation levels of the users and jammers populations. We also provide insights into resulting ESS strategies as a function of the number of users and jammers, and their channel qualities.",
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Abass, AAA, Hajimirsadeghi, M, Mandayam, N & Gajic, Z 2016, Evolutionary game theoretic analysis of distributed denial of service attacks in a wireless network. in 2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016., 7460473, 2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 36-41, 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016, Princeton, United States, 3/16/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2016.7460473

Evolutionary game theoretic analysis of distributed denial of service attacks in a wireless network. / Abass, Ahmed A.Alabdel; Hajimirsadeghi, Mohammad; Mandayam, Narayan; Gajic, Zoran.

2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 36-41 7460473 (2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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AU - Abass, Ahmed A.Alabdel

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N2 - We consider a wireless network of M users connected to an access point in the presence of N jammers whose purpose is to deny or degrade the performance of the users by injecting interference. Using the achieved signal to inference plus noise ratio (SINR) as the performance metric, we study the dynamics of such a distributed denial of service attack (DDoA) by using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Specifically, we consider a cooperative network model, where the M users (and N jammers) can collectively enhance their achieved SINR (degrade the user SINR). We model the strategic transmission decisions of the users (and the jammers) using simple random access techniques where the users (and jammers) decide to transmit or not with a transmission probability, taking into account their energy costs. Using the replicator dynamics (RD), we characterize the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS's) of the game and observe that the resulting transmission probabilities turn out to be either 0 or 1. Further, given a network (channel) setting, we show using a phase portrait of the replicator dynamics how the ESS strategies evolve for different cooperation levels of the users and jammers populations. We also provide insights into resulting ESS strategies as a function of the number of users and jammers, and their channel qualities.

AB - We consider a wireless network of M users connected to an access point in the presence of N jammers whose purpose is to deny or degrade the performance of the users by injecting interference. Using the achieved signal to inference plus noise ratio (SINR) as the performance metric, we study the dynamics of such a distributed denial of service attack (DDoA) by using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Specifically, we consider a cooperative network model, where the M users (and N jammers) can collectively enhance their achieved SINR (degrade the user SINR). We model the strategic transmission decisions of the users (and the jammers) using simple random access techniques where the users (and jammers) decide to transmit or not with a transmission probability, taking into account their energy costs. Using the replicator dynamics (RD), we characterize the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS's) of the game and observe that the resulting transmission probabilities turn out to be either 0 or 1. Further, given a network (channel) setting, we show using a phase portrait of the replicator dynamics how the ESS strategies evolve for different cooperation levels of the users and jammers populations. We also provide insights into resulting ESS strategies as a function of the number of users and jammers, and their channel qualities.

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PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

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Abass AAA, Hajimirsadeghi M, Mandayam N, Gajic Z. Evolutionary game theoretic analysis of distributed denial of service attacks in a wireless network. In 2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 36-41. 7460473. (2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016). https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2016.7460473