TY - GEN
T1 - Fair division under cardinality constraints
AU - Biswas, Arpita
AU - Barman, Siddharth
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. All right reserved.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods-i.e., the goods are categorized-and a limit is specified on the number of goods that can be allocated from each category to any agent. The objective here is to find a fair allocation in which the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality constraints. This problem naturally captures a number of resource-allocation applications, and is a generalization of the well-studied (unconstrained) fair division problem. The two central notions of fairness, in the context of fair division of indivisible goods, are envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and (approximate) maximin share guarantee (MMS). We show that the existence and algorithmic guarantees established for these solution concepts in the unconstrained setting can essentially be achieved under cardinality constraints. Furthermore, focusing on the case wherein all the agents have the same additive valuation, we establish that EF1 allocations exist even under matroid constraints.
AB - We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods-i.e., the goods are categorized-and a limit is specified on the number of goods that can be allocated from each category to any agent. The objective here is to find a fair allocation in which the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality constraints. This problem naturally captures a number of resource-allocation applications, and is a generalization of the well-studied (unconstrained) fair division problem. The two central notions of fairness, in the context of fair division of indivisible goods, are envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and (approximate) maximin share guarantee (MMS). We show that the existence and algorithmic guarantees established for these solution concepts in the unconstrained setting can essentially be achieved under cardinality constraints. Furthermore, focusing on the case wherein all the agents have the same additive valuation, we establish that EF1 allocations exist even under matroid constraints.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85055682654
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85055682654#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.24963/ijcai.2018/13
DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2018/13
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85055682654
T3 - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
SP - 91
EP - 97
BT - Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
A2 - Lang, Jerome
PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
T2 - 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
Y2 - 13 July 2018 through 19 July 2018
ER -