Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games

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A Nash equilibrium $$x$$x of a normal-form game $$G$$G is essential if any perturbation of $$G$$G has an equilibrium close to $$x$$x. Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)277-300
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 12 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Continuous security
  • Equilibrium existence
  • Equilibrium refinement
  • Essential equilibrium
  • Infinite normal-form game


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