Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

A Nash equilibrium $$x$$x of a normal-form game $$G$$G is essential if any perturbation of $$G$$G has an equilibrium close to $$x$$x. Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)277-300
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume59
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 12 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Continuous security
  • Equilibrium existence
  • Equilibrium refinement
  • Essential equilibrium
  • Infinite normal-form game

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this