Good fences make good neighbors: A longitudinal analysis of an industry self-regulatory institution

Michael L. Barnett, Andrew A. King

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

196 Scopus citations

Abstract

We extend theories of self-regulation of physical commons to analyze self-regulation of intangible commons in modern industry. We posit that when the action of one firm can cause "spillover" harm to others, firms share a type of commons. We theorize that the need to protect this commons can motivate the formation of a self-regulatory institution. Using data from the U.S. chemical industry, we find that spillover harm from industrial accidents increased after a major industry crisis and decreased following the formation of a new institution. Additionally, our findings suggest that the institution lessened spillovers from participants to the broader industry. Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1150-1170
Number of pages21
JournalAcademy of Management Journal
Volume51
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2008
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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