Hardware Trojan horse benchmark via optimal creation and placement of malicious circuitry

Sheng Wei, Kai Li, Farinaz Koushanfar, Miodrag Potkonjak

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

39 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper proposes Hardware Trojan (HT) placement techniques that yield challenging HT detection benchmarks. We develop three types of one-gate HT benchmarks based on switching power, leakage power, and delay measurements that are commonly used in HT detection. In particular, we employ an iterative searching algorithm to find rarely switching locations, an aging-based approach to create ultra-low power HT, and a backtracking-based reconvergence identification method to determine the non-observable delay paths. The simulation results indicate that our HT attack benchmarks provide the most challenging representative test cases for the evaluation of side-channel based HT detection techniques.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC '12
Pages90-95
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event49th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC '12 - San Francisco, CA, United States
Duration: Jun 3 2012Jun 7 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings - Design Automation Conference
ISSN (Print)0738-100X

Other

Other49th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC '12
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco, CA
Period6/3/126/7/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation

Keywords

  • benchmark
  • gate-level characterization
  • hardware trojan
  • process variation

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