Impact of Tournament Incentives on Management Earnings Forecasts

Xin Cheng, Dan Palmon, Yinan Yang, Cheng Yin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


This paper examines how rank-order tournament incentives in the top management team (TMT) influence the quality of management earnings forecasts (MEFs). Instead of breeding feelings of inequality and fostering peer sabotage, the large pay gap between the CEO and subordinates may motivate top executives to issue more accurate and precise forecasts to win the prize of promotion. The positive tournament effect on the quality of MEFs is weakened (strengthened) when the perceived probability of promotion for candidates is low (high). We find that firms with higher tournament incentives are more likely to issue supplementary forecasts to increase the credibility of MEFs. By examining the tournament effect at each subordinate manager level, we find that CFOs are the driving force in controlling the frequency and quality of management forecasts and chief marketing officers (CMOs) may also contribute to the quality of management forecasts. The results are robust to multiple measures of tournament incentives and multiple research designs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)225-254
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2024

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)


  • management earnings forecasts
  • supplementary forecasts
  • tournament incentives


Dive into the research topics of 'Impact of Tournament Incentives on Management Earnings Forecasts'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this