Implementation in perfect equilibria

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This paper considers implementation when the feasible outcomes are lotteries over a finite set of alternatives. The following weak condition is sufficient for implementation in trembling hand perfect equilibria (with three or more players): if all but one player agree on which alternative is the best, this alternative is (among those that are) chosen by the social choice rule, and if all but one player agree on which alternative is the worst, this alternative is not chosen. Many interesting social choice rules that are not Nash implementable satisfy this condition. On the other hand, there are social choice rules that are implementable in Nash equilibria but not in perfect equilibria.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)97-106
Number of pages10
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1993
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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