Information Advantage in a Public Good Economy with Multiplicative Structure of Utilities

Shlomit Hon-Snir, Benyamin Shitovitz, Menahem Spiegel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper extends results on information advantage in Cournot oligopoly to a public good economy with uncertainty and private information where the state-dependent utilities have a multiplicative structure. We show that in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where consumers' contributions are positive in all states of nature, a consumer with superior information is rewarded with a higher ex ante expected utility. Our counter example shows that in the case where one consumer does not contribute, information disadvantage might emerge. Thus, the interiority assumption is essential to obtain our results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)757-765
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume14
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

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