Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information

Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421-2453).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)222-241
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume45
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2003

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Core
  • Incentive compatibility
  • Incomplete information
  • Informational size

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