It is a pleasure to continue a longstanding conversation with our honoree on questions about the nature of belief and how that bears on the theory of knowledge. - Can belief be a sort of performance? - Can it be motivated at all, much less properly motivated, by reasons that are pragmatic rather than epistemic? These are questions on which we disagree, under what Engel considers a more general clash over the sort of normativity that is proper to epistemology. He attributes to me a kind of teleological/axiological normativity, whereas he opts rather for a normativity that is deontic. In his view there are norms of belief, at a minimum a truth norm, and also a knowledge norm. You ought not to believe what is not true, nor even what you do not know to be true, see [Engel 2013], [Sosa 2013].
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History and Philosophy of Science