Knowledge entails dispositional belief

David Rose, Jonathan Schaffer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people's intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) belief.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)19-50
Number of pages32
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume166
Issue numberSUPPL1
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2013

Fingerprint

Intuition
Vindication
Conception
Orthodoxy
Counterexample

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Belief
  • Experimental philosophy
  • Knowledge
  • Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel
  • Radford

Cite this

Rose, David ; Schaffer, Jonathan. / Knowledge entails dispositional belief. In: Philosophical Studies. 2013 ; Vol. 166, No. SUPPL1. pp. 19-50.
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Knowledge entails dispositional belief. / Rose, David; Schaffer, Jonathan.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 166, No. SUPPL1, 01.12.2013, p. 19-50.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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