Knowledge entails dispositional belief

David Rose, Jonathan Schaffer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

31 Scopus citations

Abstract

Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people's intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) belief.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)19-50
Number of pages32
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume166
Issue numberSUPPL1
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2013

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Belief
  • Experimental philosophy
  • Knowledge
  • Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel
  • Radford

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