Abstract
There are many instances in which even in a democracy, the political preferences held by a minority of the electorate are reflected in political outcomes. It is sho\vn that for a simple two-alternative election environment characterized by costly voting and private information, when the expected population is very large the alternative preferred by more expected "zealous" voters, who have either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating, wins with high probability in any equilibrium, even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that preference is arbitrarily small. This is an undesirable outcome under either of two natural but very different normative criteria.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1199-1217 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Journal of Political Economy |
| Volume | 107 |
| Issue number | 6 PART 1 |
| State | Published - Dec 1 1999 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
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Large electorates and decisive minorities. / Campbell, Colin.
In: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 6 PART 1, 01.12.1999, p. 1199-1217.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Large electorates and decisive minorities
AU - Campbell, Colin
PY - 1999/12/1
Y1 - 1999/12/1
N2 - There are many instances in which even in a democracy, the political preferences held by a minority of the electorate are reflected in political outcomes. It is sho\vn that for a simple two-alternative election environment characterized by costly voting and private information, when the expected population is very large the alternative preferred by more expected "zealous" voters, who have either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating, wins with high probability in any equilibrium, even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that preference is arbitrarily small. This is an undesirable outcome under either of two natural but very different normative criteria.
AB - There are many instances in which even in a democracy, the political preferences held by a minority of the electorate are reflected in political outcomes. It is sho\vn that for a simple two-alternative election environment characterized by costly voting and private information, when the expected population is very large the alternative preferred by more expected "zealous" voters, who have either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating, wins with high probability in any equilibrium, even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that preference is arbitrarily small. This is an undesirable outcome under either of two natural but very different normative criteria.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0033383090&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0033383090
VL - 107
SP - 1199
EP - 1217
JO - Journal of Political Economy
JF - Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0022-3808
IS - 6 PART 1
ER -