Abstract
Under most U.S. environmental regulations, the federal government shares responsibility with the states by authorizing them to implement and enforce federal policies. Authorization provides states with considerable discretion over the effects of regulation and is perhaps the most significant decentralization in U.S. environmental policy. However, few studies address its role. To fill this gap, this paper explores the empirical determinants of authorization for water pollution and hazardous waste regulation. Although no single hypothesis strongly explains authorization, I find some evidence that states authorize to increase the stringency of regulation, which suggests that environmental decentralization would be beneficial.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 107-122 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | National Tax Journal |
Volume | 56 |
Issue number | 1 I |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2003 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics