Managing reputation through collusion

Michael L. Barnett; Andreas G.F. Hoepner; Sean Lux; Irena Timofeeva

doi:10.5465/AMBPP.2012.13

Managing reputation through collusion

Michael L. Barnett, Andreas G.F. Hoepner, Sean Lux, Irena Timofeeva

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Abstract

Do firms collude to improve their reputations? We examine Fortune's America's Most Admired Companies (AMAC) reputation scores from 1985 to 2010. We find that those firms deemed to have greater concern for reputation and opportunity to interact had significantly higher AMAC scores. These results support the existence of reputation collusion.

Original language	English (US)
Pages	1356-1361
Number of pages	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2012.13
State	Published - 2012
Externally published	Yes
Event	72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012 - Boston, United States Duration: Aug 7 2012 → Aug 10 2012

Other

Other	72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012
Country/Territory	United States
City	Boston
Period	8/7/12 → 8/10/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Management of Technology and Innovation
Industrial relations
Management Information Systems

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10.5465/AMBPP.2012.13

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title = "Managing reputation through collusion",

abstract = "Do firms collude to improve their reputations? We examine Fortune's America's Most Admired Companies (AMAC) reputation scores from 1985 to 2010. We find that those firms deemed to have greater concern for reputation and opportunity to interact had significantly higher AMAC scores. These results support the existence of reputation collusion.",

author = "Barnett, {Michael L.} and Hoepner, {Andreas G.F.} and Sean Lux and Irena Timofeeva",

year = "2012",

doi = "10.5465/AMBPP.2012.13",

language = "English (US)",

pages = "1356--1361",

note = "72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012 ; Conference date: 07-08-2012 Through 10-08-2012",

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AU - Barnett, Michael L.

AU - Hoepner, Andreas G.F.

AU - Lux, Sean

AU - Timofeeva, Irena

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Do firms collude to improve their reputations? We examine Fortune's America's Most Admired Companies (AMAC) reputation scores from 1985 to 2010. We find that those firms deemed to have greater concern for reputation and opportunity to interact had significantly higher AMAC scores. These results support the existence of reputation collusion.

AB - Do firms collude to improve their reputations? We examine Fortune's America's Most Admired Companies (AMAC) reputation scores from 1985 to 2010. We find that those firms deemed to have greater concern for reputation and opportunity to interact had significantly higher AMAC scores. These results support the existence of reputation collusion.

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DO - 10.5465/AMBPP.2012.13

M3 - Paper

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EP - 1361

T2 - 72nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2012

Y2 - 7 August 2012 through 10 August 2012

ER -

Managing reputation through collusion

Abstract

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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