Ridesharing is an effective transportation mode to provide first-mile accessibility to public transit and a low-cost, environment-friendly, and sustainable mobility service. This paper designs a mechanism for the first-mile ridesharing service. The mechanism accounts for passengers’ personalized requirements on different inconvenience attributes (e.g. the number of co-riders, extra in-vehicle travel time, and extra waiting time at the transit hub) of the service in determining the optimal vehicle-passenger matching and vehicle routing plan and customized pricing scheme. The proposed mechanism is proved to be individual rational, incentive compatible, and price non-negative. The three properties respectively indicate that passengers are willing to participate in the service, that honestly reporting personalized requirements is the optimal strategy, and that the service provider is guaranteed to receive revenue from the participants. A case study is proposed to interpret the mechanism and to demonstrate the generality of the personalized-requirement-based mechanism that can be adapted into different scenarios.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Civil and Structural Engineering
- Customized pricing
- Mechanism design
- Personalized service