Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or Retaliation?

Thomas J. Prusa, Susan Skeath

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

26 Scopus citations


In this chapter, westudyworldwide antidumping (AD) case filing patterns in order to determine the extent to which economic versus strategic incentives explain the behavior of countries employing AD actions.We compare four main hypotheses: big supplier, big change in imports, tit-for-tat (TFT), and the club effect.We find strong support that AD actions are directed at big suppliers, but far weaker evidence that AD actions are filed against suppliers whose imports have surged. We also find very strong evidence that AD actions are used strategically to deter further use of AD and/or to punish trading partners who have used AD. Our findings reject the notion that the rise in AD activity is solely explained by an increase in unfair trading.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationHandbook of International Trade
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
Number of pages25
ISBN (Print)9781405120623
StatePublished - Jan 21 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


  • Deterrence
  • Importers
  • Protectionism
  • Retaliation
  • Unfair trade


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