Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or Retaliation?

Thomas J. Prusa, Susan Skeath

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this chapter, westudyworldwide antidumping (AD) case filing patterns in order to determine the extent to which economic versus strategic incentives explain the behavior of countries employing AD actions.We compare four main hypotheses: big supplier, big change in imports, tit-for-tat (TFT), and the club effect.We find strong support that AD actions are directed at big suppliers, but far weaker evidence that AD actions are filed against suppliers whose imports have surged. We also find very strong evidence that AD actions are used strategically to deter further use of AD and/or to punish trading partners who have used AD. Our findings reject the notion that the rise in AD activity is solely explained by an increase in unfair trading.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationHandbook of International Trade
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
Pages358-382
Number of pages25
Volume2-2
ISBN (Print)9781405120623
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 21 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Keywords

  • Deterrence
  • Importers
  • Protectionism
  • Retaliation
  • Unfair trade

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