On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

Tomas Sjöström

doi:10.1007/BF00183044

On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

Tomas Sjöström

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide a constructive way of checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibria. The results apply when there are two or more players. The usefulness of this constructive approach is illustrated for the case of single-peaked preferences over ℝ, a two-person public good economy with monotonic preferences, and a two-person exchange economy with monotonic preferences.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	333-340
Number of pages	8
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	8
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183044
State	Published - Oct 1991
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/BF00183044

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On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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