On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide a constructive way of checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibria. The results apply when there are two or more players. The usefulness of this constructive approach is illustrated for the case of single-peaked preferences over ℝ, a two-person public good economy with monotonic preferences, and a two-person exchange economy with monotonic preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)333-340
Number of pages8
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume8
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1991
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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