Patrolling a pipeline

Steve Alpern, Thomas Lidbetter, Alec Morton, Katerina Papadaki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

A pipeline network can potentially be attacked at any point and at any time, but such an attack takes a known length of time. To counter this, a Patroller moves around the network at unit speed, hoping to intercept the attack while it is being carried out. This is a zero-sum game between the mobile Patroller and the Attacker, which we analyze and solve in certain cases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 7th International Conference, GameSec 2016, Proceedings
EditorsEmmanouil Panaousis, Milind Tambe, Tansu Alpcan, William Casey, Quanyan Zhu
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages129-138
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9783319474120
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016
Event7th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2016 - New York, United States
Duration: Nov 2 2016Nov 4 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9996 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other7th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York
Period11/2/1611/4/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

Keywords

  • Networks
  • Patrolling
  • Zero-sum game

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