Abstract
Christopher Hill's book Perceptual experience argues for a representational theory of mind that is grounded in empirical psychology. I focus here on three aspects of Hill's picture: The objects of visual awareness, the perception/cognition border, and the epistemic role of perceptual experience. I introduce challenges to Hill's account and consider ways these challenges may be overcome.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 89-95 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Mind and Language |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 2024 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Language and Linguistics
- Philosophy
- Linguistics and Language
Keywords
- cognition
- epistemology
- perception
- reasoning