Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.05.005

Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

School of Arts and Sciences, Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of trembling-hand perfection fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	531-540
Number of pages	10
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	47
Issue number	4-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.05.005
State	Published - Aug 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

Keywords

Discontinuous game
Infinite normal-form game
Limit admissibility
Payoff security
Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.05.005

Cite this

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title = "Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games",

abstract = "We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of trembling-hand perfection fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium.",

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AB - We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of trembling-hand perfection fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium.

KW - Discontinuous game

KW - Infinite normal-form game

KW - Limit admissibility

KW - Payoff security

KW - Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

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JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

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ER -

Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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