Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games

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9 Scopus citations


We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of trembling-hand perfection fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)531-540
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number4-5
StatePublished - Aug 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


  • Discontinuous game
  • Infinite normal-form game
  • Limit admissibility
  • Payoff security
  • Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium


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