Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

doi:10.1007/s00199-020-01311-y

Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper extends Selten’s (Int J Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) notion of perfection to normal-form games of incomplete information and provides conditions on the primitives of a game that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium. The existence results, which allow for arbitrary (compact, metric) type and/or action spaces and payoff discontinuities, are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions and Cournot games with incomplete information and cost discontinuities.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1591-1648
Number of pages	58
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	71
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01311-y
State	Published - Jun 2021
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

Infinite game of incomplete information
Payoff security
Perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium

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10.1007/s00199-020-01311-y

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abstract = "This paper extends Selten{\textquoteright}s (Int J Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) notion of perfection to normal-form games of incomplete information and provides conditions on the primitives of a game that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium. The existence results, which allow for arbitrary (compact, metric) type and/or action spaces and payoff discontinuities, are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions and Cournot games with incomplete information and cost discontinuities.",

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AB - This paper extends Selten’s (Int J Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) notion of perfection to normal-form games of incomplete information and provides conditions on the primitives of a game that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium. The existence results, which allow for arbitrary (compact, metric) type and/or action spaces and payoff discontinuities, are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions and Cournot games with incomplete information and cost discontinuities.

KW - Infinite game of incomplete information

KW - Payoff security

KW - Perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium

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Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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