Pragmatic encroachment its problems are your problems!

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

The thesis of pragmatic encroachment about knowledge holds that whether a subject knows that p can vary due to differences in practical stakes, holding fixed the strength of the subject's epistemic position with respect to p. Accepting pragmatic encroachment about knowledge brings with it a significant explanatory burden: if knowledge varies with the stakes, why does knowledge show so many signs of staying fixed with variations in the stakes? This chapter argues that explanatory burdens of this general kind are harder to avoid than is commonly thought: even if you deny the stakes-sensitivity of knowledge, you will be stuck accepting the stakes-sensitivity of other statuses which, like knowledge, show the same signs of staying fixed with variations in the stakes. The chapter discusses two such statuses: reason-worthiness and emotion-worthiness. If the arguments succeed, then, the problems of pragmatic encroachment are everyone's problems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationNormativity
Subtitle of host publicationEpistemic and Practical
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages162-178
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9780198758709
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 22 2018
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Stakes
Burden
Emotion

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Keywords

  • Emotion-worthiness
  • Knowledge
  • Pragmatic encroachment
  • Reason-worthiness
  • Stakes-sensitivity

Cite this

McGrath, M. (2018). Pragmatic encroachment its problems are your problems! In Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (pp. 162-178). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0009
McGrath, Matthew. / Pragmatic encroachment its problems are your problems!. Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 162-178
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McGrath, M 2018, Pragmatic encroachment its problems are your problems! in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press, pp. 162-178. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0009

Pragmatic encroachment its problems are your problems! / McGrath, Matthew.

Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press, 2018. p. 162-178.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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McGrath M. Pragmatic encroachment its problems are your problems! In Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. 2018. p. 162-178 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0009