Abstract
In this paper, we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen in Manage Sci 18:p64-p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players' voting "yes" for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player's power. We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 41-60 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2007 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics