Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU

Francesco Passarelli, Jason Barr

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations


In this paper, we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen in Manage Sci 18:p64-p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players' voting "yes" for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player's power. We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)41-60
Number of pages20
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2007

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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