Preventing arbitrage from collusion when eliciting probabilities

Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, Bo Waggoner

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider the design of mechanisms to elicit probabilistic forecasts when agents are strategic and may collude with one another. Chun and Shachter (2011) have shown that when agents may form coalitions, many known mechanisms for elicitation permit arbitrage, allowing the coalition members to guarantee themselves higher payments by misreporting their beliefs. We consider two approaches to protect against colluding agents. First, we present a novel strictly proper mechanism that does not admit arbitrage provided that the reports of the agents are bounded away from 0 and 1, a common assumption in many settings. Second, we discover strictly arbitrage-free mechanisms that satisfy an intermediate guarantee between weak and strict properness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAAAI 2020 - 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
PublisherAAAI press
Pages1958-1965
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781577358350
StatePublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes
Event34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020 - New York, United States
Duration: Feb 7 2020Feb 12 2020

Publication series

NameAAAI 2020 - 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Conference

Conference34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York
Period2/7/202/12/20

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this