Using a microeconomic framework based on game theory, we design and analyze a pricing algorithm that encourages forwarding among autonomous (selfish) nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a joint network-centric and user-centric approach, the revenue maximizing network and utility maximizing nodes interact through prices for channel use, reimbursements for forwarding, transmitter power control as well as forwarding and destination preferences. In a three-node (two sources, one access point) network, the network converges to an architecture that induces forwarding only when the network geometries are such that forwarding is likely to bring higher network efficiency. For other geometries, the network converges to architectures that do not favor forwarding. We characterize the Nash equilibria for each geometry and design specific game implementations to achieve the most Pareto superior Nash equilibrium. In a general multi-node network, our results indicate that the nodes' willingness to forward decrease for large values of the ratio of the average internodal distance to the average distance between the access point and nodes with direct connections to it.