Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks

Omer Ileri, Siun Chuon Mau, Narayan B. Mandayam

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Using a microeconomic framework based on game theory, we design and analyze a pricing algorithm that encourages forwarding among autonomous (selfish) nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a joint network-centric and user-centric approach, the revenue maximizing network and utility maximizing nodes interact through prices for channel use, reimbursements for forwarding, transmitter power control as well as forwarding and destination preferences. In a three-node (two sources, one access point) network, the network converges to an architecture that induces forwarding only when the network geometries are such that forwarding is likely to bring higher network efficiency. For other geometries, the network converges to architectures that do not favor forwarding. We characterize the Nash equilibria for each geometry and design specific game implementations to achieve the most Pareto superior Nash equilibrium. In a general multi-node network, our results indicate that the nodes' willingness to forward decrease for large values of the ratio of the average internodal distance to the average distance between the access point and nodes with direct connections to it.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2004 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2004
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1034-1039
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)0780383443, 9780780383449
DOIs
StatePublished - 2004
Event2004 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2004 - Atlanta, GA, United States
Duration: Mar 21 2004Mar 25 2004

Publication series

Name2004 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2004
Volume2

Other

Other2004 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2004
CountryUnited States
CityAtlanta, GA
Period3/21/043/25/04

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Incentive for forwarding
  • Non-cooperative game
  • Pricing
  • Revenue maximization
  • Stackelberg game
  • Utility

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