Private investment and sovereign debt negotiations

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

The author studies models of sovereign debt bargaining of the kind proposed by Bulow and Rogoff. All agents act rationally with perfect foresight and perfect information. The main departure from previous studies is that the government of the debtor country acts on behalf of but is not identical to its representative citizen. This seemingly minor change surprisingly implies that there is an indeterminancy of bargaining outcomes, including some of the sunspots type; agreement may be delayed for many periods; and marginal debt may not be worthless. -Author

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)387-405
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume36
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1995
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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