Abstract
This paper studies cycles of nationalization and privatization in resource-rich economies. It starts with a synthesis of available evidence on the drivers and consequences of privatization and nationalization. Then it develops a dynamic model of the choice between private and national regimes for the ownership of natural resources. The choice is driven by a basic equality-efficiency trade-off: national ownership results in more redistribution of income and more equality but undermines incentives for effort. We discuss how the resolution of the trade-off depends on external variables-such as the commodity price-and domestic ones-such as the tax system. The model thus identifies the determinants of the observed cycles of privatization and nationalization and is consistent with key stylized facts.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 331-361 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | Macroeconomic Dynamics |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 1 2018 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Institutions
- Nationalization
- Natural Resources
- Oil
- Privatization