Prospects in a wireless random access game

Tianming Li, Narayan B. Mandayam

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

Game theoretic models have found widespread use in the analysis and design of radio resource management algorithms for a wide variety of systems such as cellular, ad hoc and sensor networks. The fundamental principle behind such models and much of game theory has been the reliance on expected utility theory (EUT). In this paper, we consider a simple wireless random access game where instead of following the precepts of EUT, the players follow the precepts of Prospect Theory (PT), a theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky to explain real-life decision making that often deviates from the behavior expected under EUT. Specifically, we consider a game where selfish players adjust their transmission probabilities over a collision channel according to rewards received for successful transmission while incurring energy and delay costs. We compare and contrast the Nash equilibria achieved under both EUT and PT and highlight the differences in them.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2012
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2012 - Princeton, NJ, United States
Duration: Mar 21 2012Mar 23 2012

Publication series

Name2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2012

Other

Other2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, CISS 2012
CountryUnited States
CityPrinceton, NJ
Period3/21/123/23/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems

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