Public debt, migration, and shortsighted politicians

Christian Schultz; Tomas Sjöström

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00185.x

Public debt, migration, and shortsighted politicians

Christian Schultz, Tomas Sjöström

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze amodel where local public debt levels are set by politicians who are chosen in local elections. Migration causes an externality across districts, and leads to overaccumulation of local public debt. Since debt is a strategic substitute, the median voters in each district prefer shortsighted political leaders who "borrow and spend," thereby exacerbating the problem of overaccumulation of local public debt.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	655-674
Number of pages	20
Journal	Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume	6
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00185.x
Publication status	Published - Dec 1 2004
Externally published	Yes

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Sociology and Political Science
Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Schultz, C., & Sjöström, T. (2004). Public debt, migration, and shortsighted politicians. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 6(5), 655-674. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00185.x

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10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00185.x