Abstract
This article responds to Michael Blauberger and Berthold Rittberger's article “Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks,” published in Regulation & Governance in 2015. Blauberger and Rittberger challenged our previous work on the politics of Eurocracy, disputing our argument that political considerations, not functional ones, explain the choice of bureaucratic structure in the European Union (EU). Blauberger and Rittberger suggest that functional considerations do indeed explain why policymakers sometimes prefer governance through European Regulatory Networks rather than through more centralized EU agencies, and argue that we have misunderstood the preferences of EU legislative principals. In this article, we argue that there are significant flaws in Blauberger and Rittberger's analysis on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We show that a proper interpretation of developments in both telecoms and competition lends support to our theoretical claims and not those offered by Blauberger and Rittberger.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 213-222 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Regulation and Governance |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 1 2017 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
- Public Administration
- Law
Keywords
- European Union
- agencies
- competition
- regulation
- telecommunications
Cite this
}
Reconceptualizing European Union regulatory networks : A response to Blauberger and Rittberger. / Tarrant, Andrew; Kelemen, Roger.
In: Regulation and Governance, Vol. 11, No. 2, 01.06.2017, p. 213-222.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Reconceptualizing European Union regulatory networks
T2 - A response to Blauberger and Rittberger
AU - Tarrant, Andrew
AU - Kelemen, Roger
PY - 2017/6/1
Y1 - 2017/6/1
N2 - This article responds to Michael Blauberger and Berthold Rittberger's article “Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks,” published in Regulation & Governance in 2015. Blauberger and Rittberger challenged our previous work on the politics of Eurocracy, disputing our argument that political considerations, not functional ones, explain the choice of bureaucratic structure in the European Union (EU). Blauberger and Rittberger suggest that functional considerations do indeed explain why policymakers sometimes prefer governance through European Regulatory Networks rather than through more centralized EU agencies, and argue that we have misunderstood the preferences of EU legislative principals. In this article, we argue that there are significant flaws in Blauberger and Rittberger's analysis on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We show that a proper interpretation of developments in both telecoms and competition lends support to our theoretical claims and not those offered by Blauberger and Rittberger.
AB - This article responds to Michael Blauberger and Berthold Rittberger's article “Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks,” published in Regulation & Governance in 2015. Blauberger and Rittberger challenged our previous work on the politics of Eurocracy, disputing our argument that political considerations, not functional ones, explain the choice of bureaucratic structure in the European Union (EU). Blauberger and Rittberger suggest that functional considerations do indeed explain why policymakers sometimes prefer governance through European Regulatory Networks rather than through more centralized EU agencies, and argue that we have misunderstood the preferences of EU legislative principals. In this article, we argue that there are significant flaws in Blauberger and Rittberger's analysis on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We show that a proper interpretation of developments in both telecoms and competition lends support to our theoretical claims and not those offered by Blauberger and Rittberger.
KW - European Union
KW - agencies
KW - competition
KW - regulation
KW - telecommunications
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85020274036&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85020274036&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/rego.12135
DO - 10.1111/rego.12135
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85020274036
VL - 11
SP - 213
EP - 222
JO - Regulation and Governance
JF - Regulation and Governance
SN - 1748-5983
IS - 2
ER -