Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations


We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)555-582
Number of pages28
JournalTheoretical Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


  • Discontinuous game
  • Essential equilibrium
  • Potential game
  • Stable set
  • Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium


Dive into the research topics of 'Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this