Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau; Richard P. McLean

doi:10.3982/TE1178

Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard P. McLean

School of Arts and Sciences, Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	555-582
Number of pages	28
Journal	Theoretical Economics
Volume	9
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1178
State	Published - 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Keywords

Discontinuous game
Essential equilibrium
Potential game
Stable set
Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

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10.3982/TE1178

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AB - We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

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KW - Potential game

KW - Stable set

KW - Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

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Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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