### Abstract

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2003. Secure implementation: Strategy-proof mechanisms reconsidered. Working paper 4-03-1. Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University] argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 206-235 |

Number of pages | 30 |

Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |

Volume | 57 |

Issue number | 2 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Nov 1 2006 |

### Fingerprint

### All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics

### Keywords

- Experiment
- Groves-Clarke
- Laboratory
- Learning
- Pivotal
- Secure implementation

### Cite this

*Games and Economic Behavior*,

*57*(2), 206-235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007

}

*Games and Economic Behavior*, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 206-235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007

**Secure implementation experiments : Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?** / Cason, Timothy N.; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Sjostrom, John; Yamato, Takehiko.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

TY - JOUR

T1 - Secure implementation experiments

T2 - Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?

AU - Cason, Timothy N.

AU - Saijo, Tatsuyoshi

AU - Sjostrom, John

AU - Yamato, Takehiko

PY - 2006/11/1

Y1 - 2006/11/1

N2 - Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2003. Secure implementation: Strategy-proof mechanisms reconsidered. Working paper 4-03-1. Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University] argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.

AB - Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2003. Secure implementation: Strategy-proof mechanisms reconsidered. Working paper 4-03-1. Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University] argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.

KW - Experiment

KW - Groves-Clarke

KW - Laboratory

KW - Learning

KW - Pivotal

KW - Secure implementation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33749626315&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33749626315&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007

M3 - Article

VL - 57

SP - 206

EP - 235

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 2

ER -