Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting

Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman, Yiling Chen, Daniel Reeves, Yoav Shoham, David M. Pennock

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

32 Scopus citations


We examine a class of wagering mechanisms designed to elicit truthful predictions from a group of people without requiring any outside subsidy. We propose a number of desirable properties for wagering mechanisms, identifying one mechanism - weighted-score wagering - that satisfies all of the properties. Moreover, we show that a single-parameter generalization of weighted-score wagering is the only mechanism that satisfies these properties. We explore some variants of the core mechanism based on practical considerations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEC'08 - Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes
Event2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'08 - Chicago, IL, United States
Duration: Jul 8 2008Jul 12 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce


Conference2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'08
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityChicago, IL

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Networks and Communications


  • Group forecasting
  • Mechanism design
  • Prediction markets

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