Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism: I - Brian P. McLaughlin

Brian P. McLaughlin, David Owens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the skeptical hypothesis under assessment is true, and that the prospect of a sound strongly a priori argument of this sort seems dim.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)93-118
Number of pages26
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes
Volume74
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2000

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

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